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understanding of industry operations and a tool for assessing a company’s capability and 
capacity. This study utilizes publicly available financial information and defines how a 
number of ratios can be used to reduce asymmetrical information that occurs within a 
principal–agent relationship. We examine the defense industry’s strategic-level corporate 
financial objectives and incentives and seek to understand how they impact the 
government’s procurement decisions. Finally, we make recommendations on possible 
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The better the buyer understands how the seller thinks, the better the buyer will be.1 
 
We explore how acquisition workforce (AWF) personnel across the Department of 
Defense (DOD) can improve business acumen2 to make more informed procurement 
decisions. Specifically, we select a series of measures based on contractors’ publicly 
available financial statements and explain the research-driven theoretical application of 
these measures to DOD procurement decisions. We then apply our proposed measures to 
the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) contract of the U.S. Army (USA) to demonstrate 
how knowledge of the financial and operational environment surrounding contractors prior 
to contract award may have resulted in a more efficient and effective procurement strategy. 
We conclude with recommendations on how the AWF can adapt and apply the proposed 
tools to facilitate procurement activities. However, financial analysis is just one of many 
tools the AWF may use to evaluate a defense contractor. After sharing the results, we aim 
to provide additional context to our findings and how the information applies to DOD 
procurement decisions. We hope that our recommendations will inform better award 
decisions and contribute to appropriate contract design, strategy, and payment structure. 
We offer a tool that may help the AWF minimize asymmetrical information3 by gaining 
insight into the offeror’s operations and financial health. Ultimately, this knowledge may 
assist the AWF to develop the most efficient terms and conditions for both the DOD and 
the contractor. 
The DOD states that efficiency and effectiveness in procurement decisions can help 
facilitate the department’s broader objectives. Given the size of defense procurements, this 
statement seems reasonable. For example, in 2020, the DOD spent one trillion dollars 
 
1 Quotation from Denean Machis, chief professional development officer of the National Contract 
Management Association. Source: National Contract Management Association (2020, para. 10). 
2 Werber et al. (2019) define business acumen as the ability to manage human, financial, and 
information resources strategically; business acumen is an understanding of industry behavior and trends 
that enables one to shape smart business decisions for the government. 
3 Eisenhardt (1989) describes asymmetrical information as a circumstance when the seller (agent) of a 
good or service possesses greater knowledge than the buyer (principal).  
   
 
2 
procuring goods and services. This amount represents 11% of total government spending 
for the same fiscal year (FY).4 The DOD is a major customer (defined as a customer to 
whom sales comprise at least 10% of total gross revenues) for many private-sector firms, 
including entities like General Dynamics (GD), Northrop Grumman (NOC), Oshkosh 
(OSK), and Lockheed Martin (LMT). For example, LMT relies upon the federal 
government for approximately 80% of its sales and has been the largest recipient of federal 
spending for the past 5 years (General Services Administration [GSA], 2020; Securities 
and Exchange Commission [SEC], 2020a). In contrast, OSK, another prominent defense 
firm, relied on the federal government for approximately 25% of its sales in 2019 (SEC, 
2014e). In addition to comprising a material and repetitive proportion of many contractors’ 
total sales, the DOD, as an agency of the U.S. federal government, enjoys distinct 
advantages relative to other customers. These include the ability to reclaim previously 
disbursed revenues and the requirement for suppliers to provide cost estimates to the 
government before receiving revenue payments.5 As Hansen and Hermis (2020) explain, 
“When Uncle Sam goes shopping, he enjoys virtually limitless bargaining power” (p. 15). 
Despite the enormousness of defense spending and the import of that spending to a large 
proportion of the private sector, the extent to which the AWF can exploit contractor-
specific knowledge to enhance the efficacy and efficiency of procurements remains 
underexplored in prior literature. This manuscript is a first step toward filling this vacancy 
in scholarly literature. 
Our interest in the role of business acumen in defense procurements arises from our 
work experience and our knowledge of the latest National Defense Authorization Acts 
(NDAAs). There has been a renewed interest in improving the DOD’s procurement 
environment and in merging education and training with industry standards. Specifically, 
the 2018 NDAA called on the DOD to assess the overall knowledge of the acquisition 
workforce regarding training, business acumen, and knowledge of industry partners, 
 
4 Government spending figures are based on obligated amounts taken from www.usaspending.gov as of 
October 30, 2020 (usaspending, n.d.).  
5 These rules are part of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and the cost accounting standards 
included therein (FAR 52.230-2, 2020).  
   
 
3 
including contractors (Werber et al., 2019). To this end, the under secretary of defense for 
acquisition and sustainment (USD[A&S]) commissioned the RAND Corporation to assess 
the skillset of the AWF in the areas outlined in the NDAA. After a six month study, RAND 
identified several areas where AWF knowledge required development. The report 
recommended educational reform to help the AWF better understand the expectations and 
outcomes of the procurement landscape. Due to the AWF’s lack of understanding and 
standardization of business concepts and standards, assessing the overall health of the 
organizations was hard to determine. The RAND study promulgated standard definitions 
for the terms business acumen, industry operations, and industry motivation (see Figure 1). 
These findings pushed the DOD to begin merging current training with industry standards. 
This new approach will allow the AWF and industry partners to better communicate and 
make sound acquisition decisions. Based on the results of this study, the AWF has 
opportunities to further expand procurement capabilities by understanding the intricacies 
of industry. 
 
Figure 1. Definitions for Business Acumen, Industry Operations, and 
Industry Motivation. Source: Werber et al. (2019). 
The USAF deputy assistant secretary for contracting, Major General Holt, 
continues to promulgate the importance of cultivating business acumen among the AWF. 
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Specifically, Maj Gen Holt created a new acquisition enterprise with multiple embedded 
lines of effort (LOE) dedicated to addressing the shortcomings identified in the RAND 
report. LOE 1, entitled Building Mission Focused Business Leaders, requires AWF to 
understand the operational, financial, and industry-specific environment surrounding 
defense contractors, with a particular focus on the role of capital market pressures in 
incentivizing certain firm behaviors.6 Maj Gen Holt defines a business leader as a 
professional that understands how industry works in financial markets, what motivates 
corporate behavior, and where/how the AWF can influence that behavior (Air Force 
Installation Contracting Center 2020). Maj Gen Holt initiated a reform that will enable the 
AWF to understand a firm’s motivations and incentives and how procurement decisions 
can more effectively address these implicit features of defense contracting. We partially 
answer this call by providing a management tool of theoretically robust measurements 
based on contractors’ financial statement data. We also apply our proposed measures to a 
contemporary DOD procurement action to demonstrate how business acumen can enhance 
defense procurement. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study addresses the following research questions: 
∑ How does understanding a contractor’s publicly available financial 
documents reduce information asymmetry? 
∑ How can the AWF use a contractor’s publicly available financial 
documents to make better procurement decisions to enhance outcomes? 
B. METHODOLOGY AND IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH 
This research analyzes how to improve DOD procurement decisions through the 
lens of agency theory. We also analyze the need to reduce the amount of asymmetric 
 
6 The term capital market pressures refers to incentives surrounding the behavior of firms whose shares 
are traded on a U.S. stock exchange (known as publicly traded firms). Capital market pressures arise as a 
result of the separation of ownership and management of the firm. Capital market pressures sometimes 
incentivize distortionary behavior by, for example, encouraging firms to quickly complete work at the 
expense of quality so they can recognize revenue on their financial statements more quickly.  
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information between the principal (government) and the agent (contractor). Asymmetric 
information between the principal and the agent results from differences in the information 
between the parties. In government acquisitions, there is a lot of information that can 
surround a particular requirement. The difference in this information can be deliberate or 
not deliberate. However, the goal of this study is to reduce the knowledge gap by exploring 
publicly available information about a company’s operations. This study takes information 
that is traditionally utilized by investors and applies theoretical applications to how that 
information provides insight into a company’s internal operations. This understanding of a 
company’s key business performance ratios not only educates the AWF on essential 
elements of business operations (such as cash flows, profit margins, and costs) but also 
allows for effective communication between government and industry partners. The AWF, 
traditionally, has not had to negotiate in the same way as industry. However, this study 
recognizes the need to understand industry motivations and negotiation language behind 
the financial ratios that we have chosen. In theory, this understanding will allow the AWF 
to be able to effectively target ways to assist a company with improving its publicly 
released ratios and allow for more effective negotiations, which results in a win–win for 
both parties. The firm benefits by releasing attractive financial statement information for 
investors, and the government can benefit in terms of cost, schedule, and performance.  
C. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This study consists of six chapters. Chapter I is the introduction. Chapter II provides 
background information on the important principles of agency theory, the unique business-
to-government (B2G) relationship, and the procurement environment. Chapter III provides 
a literature review on publicly traded companies’ financial filings and various elements or 
ratios that are outlined throughout. Chapter IV provides the methodology in which we 
apply our research to a modern case study. Chapter V, the results, summarizes how 
knowledge of the financial and operational environment surrounding contractors prior to 
contract award may have resulted in more efficient and effective procurement decisions. 
Finally, Chapter VI provides recommendations on how the USAF AWF can adapt and 
apply the proposed tools to facilitate procurement activities and offers suggestions for areas 
for future research. 
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Understanding the unique DOD procurement environment and the relationships 
within is critical to fully understanding the motives underlying DOD contractors’ behavior. 
An economic concept known as agency theory plays a key role in understanding the 
operational context surrounding contracting firms. Agency theory refers to distortions in 
economic outcomes that occur when the party initiating a transaction (such as a purchase) 
is separate than the party responsible for executing under an agreement, such as a supplier. 
Agency problems arise because the initiator (principal) and the executor (agent) are 
separate economic actors, and each knows different information (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Because of frictions like the cost of information acquisition, it is difficult for principals and 
agents to form contracts that fully reduce the extent of information asymmetry.  
Agency theory manifests in contractor behavior in several ways that are of interest 
to the AWF. First, research demonstrates that firms facing capital market pressures, such 
as the pressure to meet shareholders’ expectations of earnings, may engage in distortionary 
behavior like cutting research and development (R&D) funding to facilitate meeting 
external benchmarks based on reported numbers (Gunny, 2010). In addition to distorting 
optimal investment in desirable functions like research and hiring the best employees, 
contractors may plausibly respond to capital market pressures induced by agency problems 
by rushing the completion of contract work, at the expense of quality, to enable them to 
accelerate revenue recognition on their financial statements. Agency theory also subsumes 
optimal contractor behavior by creating incentives for firms to employ legal discretion in 
financial reporting to achieve targets in reported numbers.7 A significant body of literature, 
too large to fully discuss, documents the relationship between market pressures and 
obfuscation of the firm’s true underlying economic position. For example, Jones (1991) 
found that firms who face heightened regulatory scrutiny voluntarily reduce reported 
earnings to minimize the extent of attention they face, while J. Cohen et al.(2010) found 
 
7 The use of illegal discretion is considered financial reporting fraud and is not within the scope of this 
thesis.  
   
 
8 
that firms use advertising as a tool to temporarily inflate earnings and enable them to meet 
benchmarks.  
Prior literature suggests that recipients of DOD contracts who are also subject to 
similar incentives (that is, all publicly traded contractors) face clear pressures to maximize 
the firm’s stock price. Studies have also found that companies with increased profits will 
tend to buy back their shares in order to increase their overall share price; this increase in 
share price makes the company appear more attractive to investors and also benefits the 
chief executive officer (CEO) in the form of executive compensation plans (Morgan, 
2019). To the extent that contractors face a trade-off between providing the best service 
and value under a given government procurement action and maximizing firm value, 
scholarly findings indicate that contractors are likely to engage in self-interested behavior 
at the expense of the DOD. However, the well-documented self-serving incentives of 
corporate entities represent an opportunity for the AWF; if the AWF can understand the 
contractor-specific incentives surrounding an individual procurement action, they can 
better design procurement contracts to balance DOD’s need for timely, high quality, and 
value-driven acquisitions with the contractor’s imperative to meet reporting goals. 
Financial statement ratio analysis, further discussed in Chapter V, is a powerful tool to help 
the AWF reach this goal.  
Firms relying upon the public sector (government sales) for a greater portion of its 
sales engage in behavior substantially different from those depending on the private sector 
(commercial sales). Understanding the unique institutional environment in which defense-
reliant contractors operate is a critical first step to cultivating the business acumen called 
for by the DOD’s leaders. Generally, the DOD’s bargaining power should be greater with 
those firms most reliant upon government business. We refer to this later as dependency. 
In recent years, the government has begun to study its procurement process more 
as a business rather than a political process. Although the government does not rely on 
profit, the principles of reducing costs and gaining efficiencies are very important. Many 
studies have identified important truths about the unique B2G relationship. These studies 
have also identified ways the government can operate more like industry, educate its 
personnel similarly, and relate with industry partners. In the 2018 National Defense 
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Strategy, there is an emphasis on transitioning the government to adopt industry standards 
and perform procurement functions that align better with industry practice. This directive 
will allow for more common ground and understanding within the B2G relationships. 
A. REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
 Prior literature identifies political pressures and accompanying differences in risk 
tolerance as the primary characteristics that distinguish contractors’ engagements with the 
federal government, or B2G, from sales to private-sector partners—known as business-to-
business or B2B (Josephson et al., 2019). First, political cycles may cause dramatic 
differences in federal defense spending. For example, management from firms pays close 
attention to the political climate on Capitol Hill. How much of the taxpayer’s dollar is 
allocated to defense spending depends on which elected members are in power; this 
ultimately trickles down to the defense contractor. In 2016, the Obama administration 
passed a $585 billion defense budget (Department of Defense [DOD], 2015). 
Comparatively, the budget was $718 billion for FY2020 under President Trump (Office of 
Management and Budget [OMB], 2019). With the change in administration, defense 
spending has increased; however, this may not hold true in the future. Budget cuts are a 
common federal administrative tool that has adverse effects on defense industry partners. 
Funding instability exposes firms to risks including increased bureaucratic rules and 
regulations to control spending that flows down to contractors (Josephson et al., 2019). In 
addition, Josephson et al. found that political pressures also shape the nature of government 
procurements as the government’s objective is to maximize value and adhere to 
socioeconomic policies (p. 54). In the DOD, these socioeconomic goals manifest in 
preferences for entities such as small businesses, veteran- or minority-owned businesses, 
and businesses owned by women.8 The value- and welfare-maximizing objectives of B2G 
transactions contrast sharply with the profit-maximizing objectives of B2B transactions 
(Josephson et al., 2019 
 
8 “It is the policy of the Government to provide maximum practicable opportunities in its acquisitions to 
small business, veteran-owned small business, service-disabled veteran-owned small business, HUBZone 
small business, small disadvantaged business, and women-owned small business concerns” (FAR 19.201, 
2020, para. [a]). 
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A vast body of statutory regulation also shapes B2G activities. For example, federal 
procurements are subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and DOD 
procurements are further regulated by Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS). The FAR and DFARS outline the procedures governing the buyer 
(government’s) behavior surrounding procurements of goods and services and are intended 
to unify and control the many procurement arms of executive agencies (Wilkinson et al., 
2017). These heavily regulated relationships are intended to control behaviors and 
outcomes and place demands above typical industry operations (Josephson et al., 2019). 
For example, contractors to the DOD are subject to cost accounting standards (CAS) with 
many contracting strategies, which affects their cost accounting practices and is intended 
to provide the government with greater insight into contractors’ cost estimation and cost 
formation policies. Additionally, another difference between B2B and B2G stems from 
differences in the “relationship-building tactics being heavily regulated” (Josephson et al., 
2019, p. 54). The AWF personnel are restricted in the relationships with a contractor. AWF 
personnel are also not allowed to accept any gestures of gratitude from the contractor. 
However, in the B2B sector, building relationships is highly encouraged, as relationships 
are important to building a successful and strong supply chain. 
B. CUSTOMER BARGAINING POWER: B2G RELATIONSHIP 
Josephson et al. (2019) stated, “The government’s purchasing footprint is enormous 
and cannot be duplicated in the commercial sector, whether in dollar value or the number 
of contracts” (p. 50). The DOD is no exception to this characterization. According to 
www.usaspending.gov, the DOD was obligated $926 billion for FY2019. This obligated 
amount represented approximately 4.3% of the U.S.’s gross domestic product (GDP) for 
2019 (Bureau of Economic Analysis [BEA], 2020). This spending exceeded the total of 
the next top 10 countries in the world combined, including Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
Saudi Arabia, and South Korea (Tian et al., 2020). According to the GSA, the Big 5 
contractors (i.e., Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Dynamics, Raytheon Technologies,9 
 
9 On April 3, 2020, Raytheon Technologies Corporation announced the successful completion of the all-
stock merger of equals transaction between Raytheon Company and United Technologies Corporation. 
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and Northrop Grumman) received approximately 14% ($129 billion) of the entire DOD 
budget for FY 2019.  
The unique nature of federal contracting in general and defense contracting creates 
strong contractor-specific incentives to invest in the government, the contractors’ major 
customer. This customer-specific dependency manifests in large contractor revenues 
derived from the DOD. For example, in calendar year 2019, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed 
Martin, and General Dynamics all derived at least 60% of gross sales from the DOD (SEC, 
2019b, 2020a, 2020b). Prior literature finds that extensive engagement with major 
customers can result in behavior both beneficial and harmful. For example, Patatoukas 
(2012) found that suppliers who have large customers in the commercial (nongovernment) 
sector enjoy supply chain efficiencies generally unavailable to firms with a more diverse 
customer base. Anecdotally, firms that repeatedly engage with the same major customer, 
like DOD contractors, cultivate customer- and industry-specific knowledge that enhances 
the supplier’s ability to perform well under procurement contracts. However, research also 
finds that the presence of a major customer can magnify agency problems and lead to 
distortionary behavior by contractors. For example, Hermis (2020) found that contractors 
exploit political networks to obtain contract pricing terms that shift the risk of cost overruns 
onto the federal government, while Brogaard and Pan (2020) found that firms also exploit 
network relationships to obtain additional contract modifications and extend completion 
times under existing contracts. Taken together, the regulatory environment and unique 
customer–supplier relationships found in the DOD imbue defense procurements with 
unique institutional characteristics and highlight the importance of business acumen among 
the AWF to enable the department to efficiently and effectively obtain required goods and 
services. 
Research shows additional advantages to this unique B2G relationship. First, due 
to the highly regulated environment surrounding federal acquisitions (i.e., under the FAR 
and the U.S. Code [U.S.C.]), government tends to pursue longer-term contracts, which 
contributes to greater firm stability as it lowers a firm’s uncertainty for demand (Cohen & 
Li, 2020). Second, defense contractors are less likely to default or declare bankruptcy than 
firms that rely upon commercial business (Goldman et al., 2013). Mills et al. (2013) stated, 
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this advantage applies to larger firms in the product market that are experiencing success 
due to many sole source procurement contracts. These same firms also experience more 
consistency in demand. Third, firms that rely upon large federal government agencies for 
sales encounter less competition overall (Mills et al., 2013). Fourth, the government offers 
cost reimbursement contracts, which is not an industry practice (Josephson et al., 2019). 
These types of contracts are typical for R&D as the requirement for the product and/or 
service is less defined than a commercial item (FAR 16.3, 2020). This arrangement 
reimburses costs for companies based upon work performance. The government bears the 
greater financial burden, as the objective may not be achieved due to insufficient 
knowledge (specifications) of the end-product. Also, the firm requires extensive oversight 
as the government relies on a “good faith effort” to stay within the estimated costs 
(Needham, 2009, p. 4). This contract allows and encourages companies to make technical 
specific investments without having to invest their own capital. It creates a win–win 
solution by furthering government objectives, developing a more capable industry, and 
furthering a firm’s knowledge and experience at no cost to the defense contractor. 
C. DEPENDENCY 
A critical part to understanding the government’s commercial partners leans upon 
understanding their commitment to government contracts. A company’s revenue 
dependency is an important part of understanding how the company will behave and will 
assist in understanding the environment surrounding their financial statements. According 
to Josephson et al. (2019), this dependency can be measured in breadth (diversity of their 
portfolio) and depth (level of commitment to a specific agency). For example, of the five 
major companies mentioned above, the three defense contractors most dependent on 
government contracts by total sales were Northrop Grumman (NOC; 83%), LMT (71%), 
and General Dynamics (GD; 66%) (SEC, 2019b, 2020a, 2020b).  
Companies with low breadth have a smaller variety customer base, while firms with 
high breadth have revenues streaming from a larger variety of agencies. This is important 
to understand as there are risks associated. This will change the way a company behaves 
and builds proposals in a B2G market. The breadth and depth of a company’s affairs with 
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the government can be evaluated in the publicly available financial information (Josephson 
et al., 2019). 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Our recommendation of specific tools to cultivate the business acumen of AWF 
personnel draws on two streams of literature: economic literature addressing agency theory 
and finance and accounting literature addressing the ability of various financial statement 
measures to capture latent characteristics of the firm’s operational environment. We 
analyze the impact of agency problems and information asymmetry on business incentives 
and outcomes and the use of financial reports and disclosures as a mechanism to mitigate 
the extent of asymmetric information between business parties.  
A. AGENCY THEORY 
Agency theory is an economic and social sciences theoretical model that attempts 
to inform the principal (government official) and agent (contractor) of the potential 
conflicts of interest before entering into a contractual agreement (Eisenhardt, 1989). For 
the purposes of this study, we view this theoretical framework primarily from the 
government’s (i.e., principal’s) perspective. If the government issues a request for proposal 
(RFP) for a product or service, private industry (i.e., the agent) assumes the government 
lacks this ability (Walker & Weber, 1984). This suggests that the agent may have greater 
expertise or capability in this arena than the principal. This knowledge gap represents one 
example of asymmetrical information (Eisenhardt, 1989). The principal’s inherent 
inadequacy (i.e., information and capability gap) can be used against them when trying to 
negotiate cost, schedule, and performance metrics (Yukins, 2010). Specifically, this gap in 
knowledge and capability reveals a governmental vulnerability and provides a 
discretionary space for private industry to determine higher costs for time, labor, and 
materials. These circumstances are most dire when products and services are dynamic, 
highly technical, and require innovation. There is an overreliance on industry to define 
these specifications.  
The type of contract will be determined by how well requirements are defined. 
After all, market research is conducted, and the government formulates a contract type 
using FAR 16.1, Selecting Contract Types (2020). Government thrives under 
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circumstances when products are well-defined, exchanges between principal and agent are 
certain, and contracts are written with specificity (Brown et al., 2013). Government also 
prefers performance-based contracts, competition from responsible firms, and a 
minimization of administrative costs (FAR 1.102, 2020, para. [b]). However, the 
government often finds itself in the marketplace for innovation (i.e., R&D). This 
environment is more unique and provides less requirement competition as requirements are 
less defined, exchanges between the principal and agent are uncertain, and contracts are 
incomplete due to the low specificity for the outcome (Brown et al., 2013). Therefore, it is 
more difficult for the government to offer well-informed and effective performance 
incentives to a firm when completion data is unclear or not available.  
To better illustrate the forces involved within agency theory, Figure 2 summarizes 
the relationship components between the principal and the agent. The figure captures the 
conflicting objectives between the government and the contractor (i.e., competing 
motivations of public policy and cash flow). These objectives are identified through 
information such as the government’s mission and the contractor’s capability (Rendon, 
2011). Competing objectives between government and industry are displayed through 
each’s behavior and determine how contracts are planned and executed (Rendon, 2011).  




Figure 2. Components of Agency Theory. Source: Rendon (2011). 
Apart from the government implementing pragmatic performance-based 
incentives, there are two additional risk mitigation practices that contracting professionals 
need to overcome. Agency theory discusses monitoring and bonding as methods to deter 
an agent’s poor or malicious behavior. Monitoring is the practice of surveillance by a 
government official during the post-award phase of the contract (Brown et al., 2013). 
Depending on the size and type of the contract, a contracting officer’s representative (COR) 
and/or the Defense Contract Management Administration (DCMA) is assigned to provide 
surveillance of the agent’s progress throughout the life cycle of the contract (Wilkinson et 
al., 2017). Monitoring a firm’s performance post-award is essential to deter the agent’s 
potential selfish behavior (i.e., moral hazard) and foster the production of quality products 
and services that meet the contract requirements (Brown et al., 2013). The COR and/or the 
DCMA use the quality assurance surveillance plan to determine compliance with the 
performance work statement (DOD, 2020; Holmstrom, 1979). Second, bonding (i.e., 
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governance rules) is a practice to reward or sanction those behaviors that complied with or 
violated the contract (Brown et al., 2013). Without these risk mitigation practices, there is 
no accountability (Yukins, 2010). Agents will be inclined to exploit their position for 
greater financial gain if given too much discretionary space.  
Agency theory discusses residual loss, a cost that is difficult to mitigate and is the 
byproduct of conducting contractual agreements with entities outside of government 
(Hannes, 2007). Examples of this type of loss include substandard levels of effort by an 
agent’s employees, leaks of confidential information to third parties, accidental relaying of 
misinformation, and opportunity costs such as hiring a less capable agent due to public 
policy requirements (Yukins, 2010). 
Agency theory allows the principal to take an objective view of industry. The 
principal (government) must learn how to proactively understand the market before 
negotiations begin if it wants an equal footing with the agent during negotiations. This 
insight enables us to view a firm for what it is, not what we believe or want it to be. A 
better understanding of an agent’s capabilities may allow the AWF to implement 
appropriate performance method strategies to achieve a more cost-effective outcome. 
B. CAPABILITY VERSUS REPUTATION 
Contributing to agency theory, federal acquisition literature describes the 
importance of contractor selection and management in relation to the agent’s reputation. 
Known as part of the source selection process, contractor performance is evaluated based 
on adequate criteria to filter out subpar contract results. Evaluation factors are described in 
detail in Sections L and M of the solicitation as AWF professionals attempt to control the 
behaviors outlined in agency theory (Acquisition Gateway [AG], 2020). If used correctly, 
the selection step can identify the quality level industry can provide; however, 
understanding a company’s performance capabilities should not be based solely on the 
company’s reputation. The evaluation process can be enhanced by the AWF’s knowledge 
of how a company may perform in the future by analyzing internal industry operations 
(AG, 2020). While not predictive in nature, certain indicators can describe the likelihood 
of performance outcomes (Randall, 2013). A contributing factor of performance is how a 
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company structures its corporate governance. This governance is typically based on a 
firm’s proxy statements and applicable SEC filings (Wang & San Miguel, 2012).  
Publicly available information can provide key insights about a firm’s overall 
capability to perform. As Williamson (1967) stated, “Capability, which is a measure of the 
contractor’s existing capacity to undertake and complete a task, should be distinguished 
from his reputation. Reputation being the contractor’s efficiency and quality of 
performance of work that the contractor has done previously” (p. 222). In other words, a 
firm should be defined by past performance and current capacity and capability, not 
reputation. For example, when a publicly traded company bids on a government contract, 
contracting officers need to determine if the firm has enough available resources to take on 
additional programs. Specifically, how would a contracting officer know if a firm has the 
capacity to accept new projects? Determining this capacity is established through metrics 
and ratios discussed later in this chapter. Analysis of a firm’s financial documentation 
expands traditional market research techniques and helps the AWF make better 
procurement decisions. 
C. PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES 
This section discusses the U.S. business landscape, federal business regulations, 
and history. While this study promotes collecting financial information from any firm 
bidding on a government contract, we focus our efforts on publicly traded companies in 
U.S. markets. All the firms discussed in this study are bought and sold on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE). If a firm wants to be traded on a U.S. exchange, it must fulfill 
the requirements outlined by the federal regulatory authority, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Some of these requirements include disclosure of quarterly and annual 
financial reports. These reports can be found on the federal government site EDGAR 
(electronic data gathering, analysis, and retrieval; SEC, n.d.).10  
The digital and information age has evolved business practices toward a higher 
degree of accountability and transparency. Access to this information was not readily 
 
10 EDGAR is the electronic filing system created by the SEC to increase the efficiency and accessibility 
of corporate filings. 
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available 25 years ago. This section provides a brief overview of U.S. market regulations 
and mandatory financial filings.  
The major accounting scandals of the dot-com bubble and financial crisis of 
2007−2008 led to many reforms of how publicly traded companies operate within the 
United States. Two of these reforms include the Sarbanes−Oxley (SOX) Act and the 
Dodd−Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Easton et al., 2018). These 
two reforms changed the way publicly traded companies report their financial data and 
conduct business. This discussion emphasizes the implications resulting from the SOX Act. 
Also known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, the 
SOX Act requires the chief financial officer (CFO) and chief executive officer (CEO) to 
be directly involved with the auditing process. Management takes personal responsibility 
for their company’s annual (Form 10-K) and quarterly (Form 10-Q) reports by certifying 
these documents as being current, accurate, and complete (J. Cohen et al., 2010). J. Cohen 
et al. (2010) also indicated that “the CFO and CEO certification requirements of SOX have 
had a positive effect on the integrity of financial reporting” (p. 782).  
According to Palmrose and Scholtz (2004), to maintain positive public perception, 
distressed firms are more likely to restate, misstate or omit their financials than stable firms. 
This is an example of a potential red flag that an AWF member should acknowledge when 
building an acquisition strategy. A firm’s restatement of financial documents indicates that 
the initial attempt was not satisfactory to the SEC. Through the research presented, we 
explore data and metrics found within financial disclosures that may indicate other 
concerns. This should encourage the government’s AWF to view this publicly available 
information as having great potential to enable them to discern if a business is capable of 
performing or producing effectively. To harness usable practices of this data, the AWF 
must possess a basic understanding of key elements from these statements. A 
comprehensive coverage of all financial factors will not be covered in this research; 
however, key elements will be described in detail. In the following discussion, we have 
identified pertinent financial data, ratios, and information to help the AWF assess the 
overall health of a company. If future efficiencies are to be obtained, the AWF should be 
required to evaluate those firms achieving the competitive zone for contract award.  
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1. Financial Statements 
Firms use financial reports to communicate their business activities with interested 
parties (e.g., shareholders). The SEC has recognized the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) as being responsible for the standardization of financial accounting and 
reporting for public and private companies. These standards are called the Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). These principles are the “authoritative guidance 
for accounting in the United States” (Stickney et al., 2010, p. 3). The reports produced on 
this guidance are published quarterly or annually and consolidate key accounting functions. 
There are four financial statements that contain accounting data that will be used in this 
study:  
1. Balance sheet of what is owed or owned at a specific point in time. 
2. Income statement describing funds earned or spent over a period of time.  
3. Statement of cash flows, which describes the exchange of funds from 
within the firm to outside the firm over time.  
4. Statement of shareholder’s equity describing the interest changes of a 
company’s shareholders over a period of time (Stickney et al., 2010). 
 Financial data elements contained in these statements will form the bulk of 
determining a firm’s overall financial health.  
2. Management Discussion and Analysis 
In addition to these statements, annual Form 10-Ks contain a robust management 
discussion and analysis (MD&A) section mandated by the SEC (Stickney et al., 2010). 
Company management uses this section to show the public how their business is 
performing using the disclosed qualitative and quantitative data. This is a section where 
nonfinancial concerns may be addressed as well. Topics covered include liquidity and 
capital resources, cash requirements, and uses of cash. The MD&A informs the reader of 
management’s operations outlook and how much cash flow is projected. The management 
sections attempt to provide current trends and uncertainties the business will face. This 
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section helps inform the reader as to why there may have been material changes, negative 
cash flows, or external debt financing (Stickney et al., 2010).  
Applicable to the government’s AWF, according to the GSA for FY2019, the top 
five U.S. defense contractors discussed budget constraints, sales strategy, foreign and 
domestic economic challenges, and cash flows as they related to the companies’ most 
lucrative programs. For example, LMT discussed future sales relating to its most lucrative 
programs, the F-35 and F-16 programs. Operating cash flow projections stemming from 
these programs help provide shareholders and potential investors with realistic 
expectations (SEC, 2020a).  
More insights can be gleaned from these publicly available financial documents. 
Generated in the statement of cash flows, steady cash flows from operations are indicative 
of a financially healthy firm. Corporate operations produce cash inflows from providing 
goods or services and selling products. Another useful indicator is found in the income 
statement. The cost of goods sold is an inventory cost expensed by firms as they sell units 
(Stickney et al., 2010). The AWF can successfully use financial statements to enhance 
understanding of the relationship between statements and their effect on business deals, 
distinguish differences in profitability versus cash flow, and highlight acquisition policy 
impact on a firm’s financials (Bowlds et al., 2015).  
3. Rates and Ratios 
Armed with data contained in the financial statements, acquisition professionals 
can use common metrics and ratios to produce greater insight into a firm’s performance 
and environment. Specifically, interested parties (shareholders and investors) regularly use 
this data to assess a firm’s liquidity, solvency,11 and profitability to determine the firm’s 
potential for growth, decline, and capability. We chose numerous measurements to help 
determine whether a firm has the capability and capacity to perform future government 
contracting. The metrics are derived from calculations taken from various data throughout 
the SEC filings. These calculations include debt to equity (D/E), gross profit margin 
 
11 Easton et al. (2018) define solvency as “a company’s ability to meet its debt obligations, including 
both periodic interest payments and the repayment of the principal amount borrowed” (p. 4-37) 
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(GPMR), net profit margin ratio (NPMR), interest-coverage ratio (ICR), operating cash 
flow (OCF), days-sales-outstanding (DSO), return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE), sales growth, sales contract backlog, Altman’s Z-score test, and the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (HHI) test. In this section, we attempt to explain and discuss the purpose 
and implications of each calculation. These implications should help guide the AWF to 
determine whether a contractor is responsible and capable of performing a certain 
government contract.  
The D/E ratio is used to help determine a company’s long-term solvency (Easton 
et al., 2018). It is a measure of how much a company borrows to leverage its assets. A 
company’s total debt includes long-term and short-term loans (e.g., bonds payable to 
creditors) and capital expenditures (e.g., investing activity to upgrade facilities). Total 
equity primarily consists of retained earnings and common stock. Equity represents the 
value of an investor’s stake in a company. The quotient of 1.0 implies the dollar amount of 
borrowed funds equals the amount of money owned by shareholders if all the company’s 
assets were sold (2018). Discerning a true meaning for this diagnostic outcome comes from 
a comparison against the industry’s historical standard.  
The GPMR is a measure of a firm’s efficiency. It describes how well a firm utilizes 
its resources to manufacture a product and/or provide a service. It is the revenue left over 
after subtracting the cost of goods sold (COGS; Stickney et al., 2010). The difference is 
divided back into total sales to determine a firm’s efficiency. For example, if a firm earns 
$10 and has expenses totaling $8, it has a GPMR of 20% (Easton et al., 2018). As stated 
earlier, this metric is best used when compared to other companies in the same industry.  
NPMR, like GPMR, accounts for a firm’s profitability after COGS. However, this 
calculation includes additional expenses, including a firm’s payment toward interest and 
taxes to lenders and the Internal Revenue Service (Easton et al., 2018). For this reason, the 
quotient of NPMR is usually much lower than GPMR. This calculation may prove a better 
method than GPMR to realize a firm’s profitability as it reveals a firm’s true earnings 
(Easton et al., 2018.) 
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The ICR determines how well a firm can pay the cost of borrowing money. This is 
an especially important metric for shareholders and creditors. Within a bankruptcy 
proceeding, creditors are paid first, and owners are paid last. Thus, if a company is unable 
to pay the interest on the principal amount loaned by a creditor, the firm is demonstrating 
financial distress. Large publicly traded companies will find it difficult to attract future 
shareholders when this metric is unfavorable. The creditor is typically a bank or an 
individual bondholder. Dividing the firm’s net income by this nonoperating expense will 
establish whether the firm is too leveraged. Once again, these metrics should be contrasted 
with an industry standard to provide an acceptable standard of risk.  
Comparing OCF to total sales reveals a firm’s ability to pay its operating expenses, 
pay off its short-term debt (current liabilities), and, ultimately, make a profit. Operating 
cash inflow is the result of subtracting sales from operating expenses. Thus, this metric 
also informs interested parties regarding how efficient a firm is at manufacturing its 
products. It is necessary to contrast this metric with the industry average to accurately judge 
a firm’s performance (Easton et al., 2018). 
The DSO metric is calculated by dividing accounts receivable (total invoices due 
during a set period) by total credit sales (invoices) and multiplying this figure by the 
number of days in sales. This metric helps management and investors answer many 
important questions: How long does it take the firm to receive a payment on an invoice 
after a sale is made? How quickly are customers paying their bills? Is there a problem 
within the firm’s collections department? In turn, this may indicate whether a firm is 
providing customer satisfaction. Last, the DSO metric can reveal weaknesses within a 
firm’s customer base. Good customers will stay within their payment cycle.  
ROA is calculated by dividing a firm’s net income by its total assets. Investors can 
judge how management is efficiently using the company’s assets to generate earnings. This 
metric is more helpful within industries that produce products (e.g., farm and heavy 
construction machinery) as opposed to services (e.g., health-care plans). As stated earlier, 
it is much more revealing to compare these metrics with firms within the same industry.  
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ROE is found by dividing net income and shareholder equity. Net income is the 
firm’s profit after all expenses have been paid. Shareholders’ equity represents what 
investors own in a firm after total assets are subtracted from total liabilities. ROE can be a 
more accurate way of calculating a firm’s asset performance compared to ROA as this 
equation accounts for a firm’s debt structure or liabilities.  
Year-over-year sales growth rate is a general way of determining whether a firm is 
on a path of growth or decline. Sales (gross revenue) are compared quarterly and annually 
by dividing the current financial results by a previous quarter’s or year’s performance. A 
larger and more established company may have lower growth rates than startups as it has 
already captured a large portion of the market. This is important because higher growth 
firms are expanding.  
The sales contract backlog and sales ratio reveal how well a company can keep up 
with customer demand. A contract backlog represents work still needing to be 
accomplished. A company with a high ratio implies the firm has numerous unfilled sales 
orders and/or unprocessed financial papers. This ratio may also give insight into a firm’s 
manufacturing (production) and inventory level (supply chain management) efficiency 
(Easton et al., 2018).  
4. Predictive Financial Indicators 
In addition to financial ratios, financial literature offers several predictive measures 
to help identify whether a firm has the capability and capacity to perform a future contract. 
Two measures have been identified for use in our research: Altman’s Z-score12 and the 
HHI.13 Altman’s Z-score is a predictive model that measures a firm’s financial distress. 
The model has been proven to be quite reliable in predicting a firm’s likelihood of filing 
for bankruptcy (Eidleman, 1995). It combines five financial ratios whose sum yields values 
leading to bankrupt, zone of ignorance, or nonbankrupt conclusions. The Z-score formula 
is as follows:  
 
12 Altman’s Z-score is not accurate for new firms. Firms’ low earnings will tend to produce a low Z-
score. The score is also limited due to the absence of cash flows in the calculation.  
13 The HHI is limited as the calculation does not account for complexities in some markets.  
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Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 1.0X5 
∑ where X1 = Working Capital/Total Assets. This measures liquid assets 
in relation to the firm’s size.  
∑ where X2 = Retained Earnings/Total Assets. This is a measure of 
cumulative profitability that reflects the firm’s age as well as earning 
power.  
∑ where X3 = Earnings Before Income Taxes/Total Assets. This is a 
measure of operating efficiency separated from any leverage effects.  
∑ where X4 = Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Debt. This ratio adds 
a market dimension.  
∑ where X5 = Sales/Total Assets. This is a standard turnover measure 
(Eidleman, 1885, p.52).  
Altman concluded that a Z-score range could be determined where certain threshold 
cutoffs indicate prediction outcomes. Established cutoffs are shown here: 
 
Bankrupt  if the Z score is less than 1.81 
Zone of ignorance if the Z score is between 1.81–2.99 
Nonbankrupt  if the Z score is greater than 2.99 
 
Z-score predictions have been proven to accurately predict “72% of bankruptcies 
two years prior to the event” (Eidleman, 1995, p. 52). The application of the score could 
be beneficial in assessing a firm’s financial condition prior to federal contract agreements.  
Another predictive model, the HHI, measures industry concentration. The HHI is 
useful in that it illustrates the competitive environment for firms operating in a specific 
industry (Rhoades, 1993). When a sensitivity analysis is applied, the HHI can also be used 
as an effective assessment tool to evaluate new entrants into an existing market (Brezina et 
al., 2016). Competition can be beneficial when seeking to obtain lower prices; however, 
fierce competition incentivizes firms to behave perfunctorily. HHI is also valuable in 
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assessing a proposed merger to identify new concentration levels. The index accounts for 
the number of firms in a market, as well as concentration, by incorporating the relative size 
(that is, market share) of all firms in a market. It is calculated by squaring the market shares 
(MS) of all firms (i) in a market and then summing the squares. (Rhoades, 1993, p. 188)  




The index can result in three levels of market concentration (Department of Justice & 
Federal Trade Commission, 2010). These levels and their corresponding ranges are  
 Unconcentrated:  HHI is below 1,500 
 Moderately Concentrated: HHI is between 1,500–2,500 
 Highly Concentrated:  HHI is above 2,500  
Implications of an HHI market concentration may also be an indicator of antitrust 
violations.  
5. Executive Compensation 
Assessing an executive’s compensation may provide additional context to the 
strategic behaviors of a firm. The definitive proxy statement (DEF 14A) informs 
shareholders how the board of directors (BOD) oversees the company’s management. This 
document also communicates relevant information pertaining to facts and circumstances 
surrounding decisions requiring a shareholder vote, discusses executive pay, and reveals 
the past and present compensation provided to top executives (SEC, 2017).  
Significant literature exists on how firms attempt to maximize firm performance 
and shareholder wealth through executive compensation (Devers et al., 2007). The BOD 
and/or compensation committees typically manage the executive’s compensation portfolio 
to influence their behavior. As mentioned previously, there are many levers at the BOD’s 
disposal to influence an executive’s behavior. Depending on the health of the company and 
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its industry, the BOD attempts to channel their executive’s focus to minimize losses (i.e., 
risk averse) or maximize gains (i.e., risk prone; Devers et al., 2007). For example, awarding 
an executive with significant stock options (option awards) should encourage greater risk. 
In turn, an executive who takes on greater risk encourages stock price volatility as there is 
a potential for greater share growth. However, once there is significant stock ownership 
within the company, an executive may become risk averse as there is a desire for stability 
(Devers et al., 2007, p. 1030). Incentive pay (option pay) should also diminish risk 
aversion. Datta et al. (2001) found that incentive pay “positively influenced the acquisition 
of high-growth targets” (p. 1028). 
Compensation theory is the attempt to understand executive behavior under various 
incentive compensation packages. How can the BOD ensure their executives maintain 
appropriate “goal alignment and risk preference” (Devers et al., 2007, p. 1025)? Different 
theories help to answer this question including agency theory, behavioral theory, and 
economic theory. A 2020 meta-analysis concluded larger companies with independent 
BODs do enhance the linkage between company performance and CEO compensation 
(Blanes et al., 2020). Current research, however, has yet to determine consistent findings 
as there are many variables to consider when conducting “complicated theoretical and 
mathematical models that are incapable of accounting for human perception and biases” 
(Devers et al., 2007, p. 1040).  
While there are inconsistent findings, the BOD does not arbitrarily compensate 
their CEOs. There is significant literature tying company priorities to executive 
compensation. The BOD utilizes many levers to award and steer their executives. 
Attempting to understand CEO motivation should be considered regardless of its uncertain 
impetus. Consulting an executive’s compensation plan is another variable highlighting a 
firm’s major priorities (Harris & Bromiley, 2007).  
6. Cash Flows 
Cash flows help company managers, investors, and analysts assess a firm’s 
performance, liquidity, financial flexibility, and operating capability. Metrics in 
determining performance include a firm’s ability to reinvest in current and future projects, 
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issue dividends, repurchase company stock, pay debtors, and meet equity obligations 
(Figlewicz & Zeller, 1991; Richardson et al., 2018). 
The government has different capabilities when determining how a firm should be 
paid and/or financed. For the purposes of this research, we focus on fixed price contracts 
as our case study uses a firm-fixed price contract. Firms can only be financed when using 
fixed price contracts. These methods include “progress payments, advance payments, 
performance-based payments, commercial item purchase financing, private financing, and 
government loan guarantees” (Feldman, 2016, p. 449). Contracting officers engage with 
industry seeking to minimize risk. FAR 32.106 (2020), Order of Preference, outlines five 
methods the government may use to provide financing for a contractor. The government’s 
first choice will be to fund a program through private financing without government 
guarantees. Second, the contracting officer can provide “customary contract financing,” 
which requires special approval and typically involves performance-based payments (FAR 
32.113, 2020). Third, the government can provide industry with loan guarantees. Fourth, 
FAR 32.501-2 (2020) allows the government to provide a firm “unusual contract 
financing,” which requires special approval and deviates from FAR Part 32 (2020), 
Contract Financing. Finally, FAR 32.402 (2020) allows the government to authorize 
“advance payments” to any type of contract provided that various stipulations are met and 
this method is used sparingly.  
As previously mentioned, the contractor is motivated by guaranteed long-term cash 
flows providing financial stability. However, each firm has different needs depending on 
the type of contract and the firm’s unique financial circumstance. The government does 
not offer custom performance-based incentives to accommodate industry. FAR 16.4 
(2020), Incentive Contracts, offers incentives based upon government-interpreted 
contractor motivations. Merely providing increased cash flows may not produce best value 
and/or customer satisfaction.  
Without adequate industry knowledge, acquisition professionals may improperly 
implement award incentives. A 2006 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 
noted, “The power of monetary incentives to motivate excellent contractor performance 
and improve acquisition outcomes is diluted by the way DOD structures and implements 
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incentives” (Hutton, 2005, p. 2). These misdirected incentives can have an enormous 
impact when recognizing how much the DOD spends on acquisitions. The FY2017 defense 
budget obligated more money than all federal agencies combined, amounting to $320 
billion (Schwartz et al., 2018). The procurement of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter represents 
one example of the effects of knowledge gaps widening between government and industry. 
In a 2017 article, Grazier contended that the wedge is created when defense contractors 
create complex support systems dependent only on themselves. In large-scale acquisitions 
like the F-35, incentives can be perverted when a defense contractor holds the government 
hostage (Grazier, 2017). As the sole producer of the F-35, Lockheed Martin has built itself 
into a $1.9 billion repair service contract that generates a revenue stream that will 
continuously feed these key ratios (Reim, 2020). This contract outcome displays the 
importance of cash flow impact from government contracts.  
The relevance of publicly traded companies’ financial documents in federal 
procurement cannot be understated. To explore this, these six factors related to financial 
documents—paired with information we obtained in the literature review—are applied to 
a real-world DOD acquisition in the form of a case study. Although this study experienced 
some limitations, the information gathered and presented can be applied to any acquisition 
intending to contract with publicly traded companies. This approach to understanding more 
about industry operations through their financial ratios will ultimately lead to reduced 
amounts of asymmetric information—subsequently leading to better discussions, 
strategies, and procurement outcomes.  
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
We chose a case study to illustrate the potential impact business acumen may have 
throughout the acquisition life cycle. As the AWF learns how to calculate and interpret 
meaningful financial data, the DOD should produce more favorable contract outcomes. We 
hope the AWF will use our case study analysis as a framework for future market research 
methods. The data and methodology in this chapter should favor the procurement 
environment by decreasing asymmetrical information between principal and agent. 
This section represents our effort to practically apply agency theory and the 
knowledge obtained from multiple firms’ publicly available financial information. We 
chose to focus on a major defense acquisition program (MDAP) with an Acquisition 
Category (ACAT) 1 designation. Companies competing for these types of contracts are 
usually large and publicly traded. Due to the dollar value placed on these types of contracts, 
there is usually an abundance of financial literature available, especially for those publicly 
traded companies involved.  
A. METHODOLOGY 
Our analysis was conducted using numerous calculations to assess the financial 
health, capability, and capacity of both companies. To utilize all the calculations, the SEC 
Form 10-K and definitive proxy statement (DEF 14A) were examined. Most variables used 
for the calculations were gathered from each firms’ financial statements while the 
executive compensation packages were viewed within the DEF 14A statement.  
The calculations include D/E ratio, GPMR, NPMR, ICR, OCF, DSO, ROA, ROE, 
sales growth, sales contract backlog, HHI test, and Altman’s Z-score test. Also, executive 
compensation is illustrated as a percentage of a firm’s sales.  
As shown in Figure 3, the calculations were divided into subcategories including 
profitability and performance, operational efficiency, solvency and stability, market 
competitiveness, and company priorities.  
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GPMR, NPMR, OCF ratio, ROE ratio, and sales growth rate are categorized 
together to determine profitability and performance. The DSO, ROA, and sales backlog 
determine a firm’s operational efficiency. The D/E ratio, ICR, and Altman’s Z-score 
represent a firm’s solvency and stability. The HHI attempts to assess the competitiveness 
of both companies within the defense industry for Military Armored Vehicle, Tank, and 
Tank Component Manufacturing. Finally, the structure behind executive compensation 
represents a firm’s priorities. These combined categories are business factors that equip the 
AWF to tailor the acquisition strategy for current conditions.  
 
Figure 3. Financial Ratios and Metrics by Category 
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B. CASE STUDY: INTRODUCTION 
The Army began the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program in 2008 within 
the Technology Development (TD) phase. The program has evolved through the 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase and into the Production and 
Deployment (PD) phase. On August 25, 2015, Oshkosh won a the most recent JLTV 
contract for $6.7 billion low rate initial production (LRIP) and obligated to manufacture 
16,901 JLTV vehicles for the Army and Marines (Feickert, 2020).    
The JLTV is a multiuse vehicle capable of supporting various operations including 
reconnaissance, patrols, raids, and convoys (Behler, 2019). The introduction of improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters pushed the military to adapt 
a transport vehicle with greater protection, mobility, and reliability. The JLTV’s 
predecessor, the Humvee (High Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles [HMMWVs]), 
was proving insufficient and costly. According to the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS), from 2006 to 2020, 45% of the 4,577 deaths in overseas contingency operations 
resulted from roadside bombs (Mann & Fisher, 2020).  
The JLTV program is an MDAP and one of the Army’s largest contracts. While 
this is an Army program, all DOD branches have appropriated funds to acquire the JLTV. 
For example, the USAF plans to replace its entire 3,270 HMMWV fleet with JLTVs 
(Feickert, 2020). The program is designated an ACAT 1D program as total expenditures 
exceed the category’s threshold of $3.065 billion. ACAT 1D programs require an approval 
authority by a defense acquisition executive (DAE). Thus far, there have been many 
contracts awarded to support development, testing, and manufacture of the JLTV. 
Contracts were awarded for the Technology Development (TD) phase, the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase, and for the low-rate initial production (LRIP). 
These contracts have spanned more than 10 years and included more than 10 different 
companies. In April 2019, the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, GA, received 
300 JLTVs and became the first unit outfitted (Feickert, 2020). On June 21, 2019, the Army 
approved OSK to begin full-rate production (FRP) of the JLTV (Judson, 2019). Currently, 
the U.S. and British military are set to procure more than 50,000 JLTV vehicles before the 
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2042 contract expiration (Feickert, 2020). Total expenditures for this program are expected 
to surpass an original estimate of $28 billion.  
OSK and Lockheed Martin (LMT) have been competing for the JLTV contract 
against numerous other defense contractors since 2008 during the TD phase. OSK and 
LMT were both part of the latest competition to manufacture the JLTV. We gathered 
relevant data from the latest JLTV program RFP (December 12, 2014) to its contract award 
(August 25, 2015). This contract was the largest to date and required its winner to conduct 
full-rate production of 49,100 JLTVs.  
We chose this contract for its size and media interest, abundance of financially 
available information (i.e., offerors are publicly traded firms), and the Army’s continued 
efforts to find best value for the JLTV program. To understand additional context to this 
particular contract, we discuss OSK’s and LMT’s sales, stock, and major programs below.  
C. COMPANY BACKGROUNDS 
OSK’s common stock has been publicly traded on both the NASDAQ stock 
exchange and the NYSE since 1985 (Davidson & Watt, 2020). It operates in four market 
segments: access equipment; defense; fire and emergency; and commercial. OSK is best 
known for manufacturing specialty vehicles including fire trucks, towers, snowplows, the 
mine resistant ambush protected all-terrain vehicle (M-ATV), and aerial scissor lifts. In 
2014, OSK’s sales were most reliant upon its access equipment (51%) while defense 
accounted for 25% (SEC, 2014e). According to the GSA for FY2014, the DOD obligated 
$540 million to OSK. This places it 59th among all DOD companies and 93rd among all 
federal departments by dollars obligated.  
OSK’s rival, LMT, has traded its common stock on the NYSE since merging with 
Martin Marietta in March 1995. As of FY2014, LMT operates in five business segments 
including aeronautics, information systems and global solutions, missiles and fire control, 
mission systems and training, and space systems (SEC, 2015a). LMT is known for various 
defense programs including the C-130, F-35, C-5, Sikorsky S-92, and F-16. In 2014, LMT 
garnered 79% of its sales from the federal government (59% from the DOD), 20% from 
foreign military sales, and 1% from U.S. commercial customers (SEC, 2015a). Its largest 
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business segments were aeronautics (32%) and space systems (18%). According to the 
GSA for FY2014, the DOD obligated $25 billion to LMT. This places it first among all 
DOD companies and first among federal departments by dollars obligated.  
D. DATA 
We used data from both companies’ filings to achieve a sufficient understanding of 
their financial condition prior to the JLTV program LRIP contract award on August 25, 
2015. Publicly traded companies are regulated by the SEC and are required to file various 
financial documents including Form 10-K, Form 10-Q, and DEF 14A. These documents 
provide a comprehensive summary of a firm’s financial performance for select periods of 
time to demonstrate transparency and accountability to its shareholders.  
Most information used within this research was captured from both firms’ 2013 and 
2014 annual reports (Form 10-K), taken from the SEC website—EDGAR (SEC, n.d.). 
These documents provided the most relevant contextual and financial data available 
leading up to the August 25, 2015, JLTV program contract award.  
Most of our analysis include variables taken from the income statement, balance 
sheet, and statement of cash flows. Figures from the income statement include: Net sales 
(revenue), cost of goods sold (COGS), gross profit, interest expense, net earnings, assets, 
total liabilities, and total shareholder’s equity. Figures from the balance sheet included 
accounts receivable, inventories, current assets, total assets, total liabilities, and total 
shareholders’ equity. Figures used from the statement of cash flows included cash provided 
by operating activities and backlogged contracts.  
Finally, the DEF 14A reveals comprehensive information about executive 
compensation and facts and circumstances surrounding decisions requiring a shareholder 
vote (SEC, 2017). Figures used from this document included executive base salary, stock 
awards, bonuses, option awards, non-equity incentive plan compensation, pension values, 
and other compensation.  
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We discuss each of the measurements within all five categories to determine as 
many insights as possible. An additional financial analysis of ten different companies 
provides context to the industry which benchmarks OSK and LMT’s measurements. 
Limitations to this study were listed in section B. In our last section, we provide our opinion 
as to the most notable insights and which firm was most deserving of the JLTV contract. 
A. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
The financial analysis assessments below attempt to provide greater context to 
whether OSK and LMT have the capacity and financial capability for contract award. 
Financial ratios taken from a firm’s financial statements are often regarded as one of the 
most informative sources about a firm’s business operations (El Hennaway & Morris, 
1983). The government does not educate and train the AWF on the significance of financial 
analysis. Thus, this method for ascertaining a firm’s capability and capacity is seldom used. 
It is customary for the AWF to evaluate a firm based upon factors outlined in FAR 
15.304.14 These factors include technical excellence, price, past performance, compliance 
with solicitation requirements, management capability, personnel qualifications, and prior 
experience. Our research aims to evaluate publicly available financial information to help 
determine the capability and capacity of a firm. For example, there are financial literature 
and metrics available that indicate a firm is technically capable of manufacturing a good 
and/or service; however, the firm may not have the capacity to execute the contract in a 
reasonable amount of time.  
There are many variables to consider when assessing a firm for contract award. 
Figure 4 comprises the structure of this research. These components include the source of 
publicly available financial information (inputs), chosen calculations (process), and 
 
14 “The quality of the product or service shall be addressed in every source selection through 
consideration of one or more non-cost evaluation factors such as past performance, compliance with 
solicitation requirements, technical excellence, management capability, personnel qualifications, and prior 
experience” (FAR 15.304, 2020, para. [c][2]). 
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generated measurements (outputs). Each calculation provides a different measurement of 
a firm’s financial standing. Based upon the implications of each calculation, results were 
assigned to the following categories: Profitability and performance, operational efficiency, 
solvency and stability, market competitiveness, and company priorities.  
 
Figure 4. Financial Calculation Inputs and Outputs 
The measurements grouped within profitability and performance attempt to 
illustrate a firm’s potential for continued growth. Essentially, this category seeks to 
understand how much cash is available for the firm to take on new projects and/or reinvest 
in ongoing operations. Operational efficiency attempts to reveal how well a firm utilizes 
its assets and manufacturing processes. It also informs the reader how quickly it 
accomplishes its sales orders. Solvency and stability measures how quickly a firm receives 
payment for services and/or products rendered as well as its ability to cover any outstanding 
debt. Market competitiveness consists of one calculation, the HHI, which attempts to 
determine whether a firm operates within a low, moderate, or highly concentrated market. 
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Last, the measurements found in the company priority category seek to understand a firm’s 
dependency and management motivation.  
While each metric used to evaluate a firm is informative, it is important to 
conceptualize the capability and capacity of a firm by understanding how each metric’s 
implications work together holistically. Three tables are used to best illustrate OSK’s and 
LMT’s performance for FY2013 and FY2014. Executive compensation, industry averages, 
and government dependency are also captured to illustrate some of the external 
environmental variables to consider. Below the tables, OSK’s and LMT’s measurements 
are discussed in greater detail within the respective categories. 
Table 1 is a direct comparison between OSK and LMT for FY2013 and FY2014. 
This comparison was created to illustrate the disparity in size. For example, LMT reported 
total sales and assets approximately 7 and 8 times greater than OSK. This table provides 
only an illustration to discuss executive compensation as a factor in determining company 
priorities.  
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Table 1. OSK and LMT Metrics, 2013–2014. Adapted from SEC (n.d.). 
 
 
Table 2 provides additional context to assess LMT and OSK. Eight peer companies 
were identified using beta.sam.gov (General Services Administration [GSA], 2020) and 
Mergent Online® (FTSE Russell, n.d.) for comparison. We took 13 measurements in four 
of the five categories for each of these firms to illustrate additional disparity among similar 
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firms. These companies have held federal government contracts and competed in the 
government and/or commercial sector. Financial data used to produce this table were 
obtained through methods outlined in Chapter IV. Competitors for this comparison include 
Boeing, United Technologies, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, BAE Systems, 
Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, PACCR Inc., Navistar International, and Oshkosh.  
Table 2. Industry Metrics, 2013–2014. Adapted from SEC (n.d.). 
 
 
Table 3 averages all the measurements used in Table 2 and provides an industry 
standard for further comparison. This table seeks to illustrate an additional layer of context 
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to further support the implications provided from each measurement. We discuss each 
category in greater detail below.  
Table 3. Industry Averages, 2013–2014. Adapted from SEC (n.d.). 
 
 
1. Profitability and Performance 
Sales growth, NPMR, ROE, and OCF calculations best express a firm’s 
profitability and performance.  
Sales growth rate is a metric used to determine whether a firm is growing or in 
decline. Total sales of a firm’s previous year are divided into the current year. In 2014, the 
industry average was −1.61% while LMT and OSK had a sales growth rate of 0.53% and 
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−11.18%, respectively. OSK, LMT, and many of the firms presented in this research cited 
sequestration15 for the decline in sales (SEC, 2014e, 2015a).  
NPMR is the most fundamental indicator in determining a firm’s profitability and 
performance. It measures if a firm can cover costs of production and garner excess cash for 
future opportunities. Table 3 shows that the industry average for 2014 was 5.87%. OSK 
and LMT performed near this standard with 4.5% and 8%, respectively (SEC, 2014e, 
2015a). Given the size difference between these companies, 8% of LMT sales equals more 
than $3.5 billion. NPMR is a more comprehensive measure as this calculation divides net 
profit into other significant expenses including COGS, operating expenses, other expenses, 
interest, and taxes (Easton et al., 2018). Once again, higher NPMRs indicate the company 
is profitable and solvent, which means they will be able to sustain operations for a DOD 
contract. Both firms have a reasonable NPMR relative to size (Wang, 2013).  
ROE measures how effectively management has utilized capital invested by 
shareholders. Net income is divided into shareholders’ equity and expressed as a 
percentage (Easton et al., 2018). In 2014, the industry average was 33.13% while LMT and 
OSK produced positive returns of 86.9% and 15.1%, respectively (SEC, 2014e, 2015a). 
For every shareholder dollar, LMT and OSK created $0.87 and $0.15, respectively (SEC, 
2014e, 2015a). A shareholder becomes more profitable when the quotient is higher. While 
LMT’s ROE is significantly higher than OSK’s and the industry average, its shareholders’ 
equity is significantly smaller. For example, OSK’s sales, assets, net income, and 
shareholders’ equity are $6.8, $4.6, $0.3, and $2.0 billion, respectively (SEC, 2014e). 
LMT’s sales, assets, net income, and shareholders’ equity are $45.6, $37.0, $3.6 and $4.2 
billion, respectively (SEC, 2015a). Thus, LMT’s dividend and divisor are not proportionate 
relative to OSK. As we learn later, LMT finances most of its operations aggressively 
through debt. 
 
15 The Budget Control Act of 2011 (Budget Control Act) established limits on discretionary spending, 
which provided for reductions to spending of $487 billion over a 10-year period that began October 1, 
2012. The Budget Control Act contains automatic spending reductions (sequestration), which went into 
effect on March 1, 2013. The Budget Control Act includes an additional reduction of defense spending by 
$500 billion over the next nine-year period (SEC, 2015a).  
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The OCF ratio is expressed as a percentage of sales and measures the firm’s ability 
to generate cash to pay suppliers, employees, and shareholders; to fund operating expenses; 
and to invest in capital assets. OCF are funds generated directly from a firm’s business 
activities. When companies have more cash flow, there is increased opportunity for growth 
as funds are reinvested to bolster the company’s resources (i.e., plant, property, and 
equipment). This metric is represented as a quotient by dividing operating cash flows 
(balance sheet) by total sales (income statement). In 2014, the industry average was 8.9% 
while OSK and LMT were 2.5% and 8.5%, respectively (SEC, 2014e, 2015a). Both firms 
emphasized operating cash flows as being the “primary source of funding for our 
operations, capital expenditures, debt service, and repayments, dividends, share 
repurchases, and postretirement benefit plan contributions” (SEC, 2020a, p. 47). 
Alternatively, excess cash flow may also be used by executives to engage in empire 
building (i.e., short-term investments that do not have a clear connection to maximizing 
performance on customer contracts, such as buying corporate jets; Gul & Tsui, 1998; 
Jensen, 1996; Lang et al., 1991; Richardson, 2006).  
2. Operational Efficiency 
ROA, GPMR, and sales contract backlog are measurements used to determine a 
firm’s operational efficiency.  
ROA is calculated by dividing net income into total assets. The quotient is a 
measure of a firm’s ability to utilize its resources efficiently. This metric is represented as 
a percentage of profit for every $1 of assets. The industry average for those 10 companies 
was 6.91%. In 2014, LMT and OSK measured 10% and 7%, respectively (SEC, 2014e, 
2015a). OSK and LMT create enough income relative to the amount of resources they use 
to create their products and/or services.  
GPMR is expressed as a percentage of remaining profit after subtracting 
manufacturing and sales costs. A higher GPMR generally indicates a firm is more efficient 
at turning sales into a measure of profitability. The average GPMR for these 10 companies 
is 12.7%. In 2014, LMT and OSK had a GPMR of 11.5% and 17.4%, respectively (SEC, 
2014e, 2015a). Both firms appear to meet and/or exceed this standard. Various implications 
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can be drawn from this measurement. First, while we might conclude that OSK is more 
efficient than LMT at processing its products, we acknowledge that LMT’s business 
includes a wide variety of products and services that OSK’s business does not (e.g., 
airplanes and missiles.) For example, a firm specializing in manufacturing missiles and 
airplanes (LMT) may be more expensive to operate than a company that specializes in all-
terrain vehicles and access equipment (OSK). Second, the discrepancy in GPMRs could 
indicate that OSK is managing input costs more efficiently than LMT. Last, high GPMRs 
may alternatively indicate that the company is cutting corners regarding product inputs. 
AWF personnel should also consult other efficiency ratios to determine capability and 
capacity.  
Sales contract backlog measures a firm’s ability to meet demand by dividing 
unfulfilled sales orders by annual total sales. The quotient is viewed as a percentage to help 
the interested party understand a firm’s future potential earnings, current capabilities, and/
or the capacity to take on additional projects. In 2014, the industry average was 170% while 
LMT and OSK were at 177% and 28%, respectively (SEC, 2014e, 2015a). Similar figures 
were present in 2013. LMT’s sales backlog may be perceived as efficient and lucrative. 
LMT is obligated to manufacture goods and/or provide a service for 1.7 years’ worth of 
sales. Alternatively, the customer (e.g., AWF) could suspect that a firm with this much 
sales backlog is having trouble keeping up with demand.16 As mentioned earlier, LMT is 
responsible for many major DOD programs including the F-35, C-130, and F-16 (SEC, 
2015a). There was no discussion within LMT’s 2013 and 2014 SEC Form 10-K mentioning 
the JLTV. It is possible an AWF member could conclude that LMT was preoccupied with 
more important and lucrative programs. OSK’s metrics may represent a negative outlook 
as future earnings are less certain due to a lack of orders still needing to be fulfilled. The 
disparity between these firms may be the length of time it takes a firm to deliver its goods 
and/or services. Does the manufacturing of all-terrain vehicles and access vehicles (OSK) 
take longer than airplanes (LMT)? Second, a firm with a smaller backlog may be viewed 
as having potentially greater capacity to meet future orders. As mentioned in the previous 
 
16 The new industry average for this metric is 130% if we discount Boeing. 
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section, OSK discussed the JLTV contract in depth for both 2013 and 2014 within its SEC 
Form 10-K. These metrics must be consulted with other quantitative and qualitative 
information to gain an accurate posture for each contractor. 
3. Solvency and Stability 
D/E ratio, ICR, DSO, and Altman’s Z-score are measures of a firm’s solvency and 
stability.  
The D/E ratio divides total liabilities into its shareholder equity. A quotient greater 
than 1 indicates that the firm is relying more on debt to fund operations. The higher the 
quotient, the more perceived risk a firm is to a creditor. A quotient below 1 indicates a 
lower risk to a creditor. Generally, a firm prefers to use internal funds, debt, and then equity 
to finance its operations (Murray & Goyal, 2003). Generally, high debt levels increase 
distress due to periodic interest payments and increased probability of bankruptcy (Gilson, 
2000; Kato, 2010; Opler, 1994). This pressure may detract from a firm’s ability to execute 
on client contracts as highly leveraged firms must prioritize lenders over customers and 
shareholders. In 2014, the industry average was 3.78 while OSK and LMT were 1.31 and 
9.90, respectively (SEC, 2014e, 2015a). More established firms may present a higher 
quotient for this ratio compared to those firms with fewer assets. Large amounts of 
borrowing is required to carry LMT’s assets which may explain LMT’s high quotient. 
While D/E ratio can indicate financial distress, it is more likely to be indicative of the 
company’s size. Large companies generally perform more efficiently on customer 
contracts because, all else equal, they have efficiencies of scale and scope not available to 
smaller contractors (Patatoukas, 2012).  
The ICR divides a firm’s operating income by the interest incurred over the year 
from borrowed funds. Generally, lenders are assured that their interest payments and 
principal will be paid if a firm’s quotient is 1.5 or higher. If the quotient is 1.4 or lower, 
current lenders become apprehensive that a firm may become financially unstable. In 2014, 
the industry average was 19.0, while LMT and OSK were 16.4 and 7.0, respectively (SEC, 
2014e, 2015a). These results indicate both firms can adequately pay the interest expense 
on their debt.  
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The DSO ratio divides a firm’s year-end accounts receivable into its total sales, 
then multiplies it by 365 (i.e., days in the reporting period). The calculation measures the 
number of days, on average, that it takes for a firm to receive payment after performing a 
service and/or delivering a good (Easton et al., 2018). In 2014, the industry average was 
67.3 while LMT and OSK were at 47.1 and 52.3, respectively (SEC, 2014e, 2015a).17 Both 
firms receive payment consistent with the industry average.  
Altman’s Z-score is a “failure prediction model” utilizing five financial calculations 
to determine a firm’s financial viability (Altman, 1983). It is a multi-variate equation which 
includes the following calculations: Working capital divided by total assets, retained 
earnings divided by total assets, earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets, 
market value of equity divided by total liabilities, and sales divided by total assets. Various 
weights are multiplied to each of these calculations and then all are added together. A firm 
with a Z-score below 1.8 is in the bankrupt zone, a Z-score between 1.8–3.0 is in the gray 
zone, and a Z-score score above 3.0 is in the safe zone (Altman, 1983).18 In 2014, LMT 
and OSK had a Z-score of 3.17 and 3.16, respectively. Both firms fell within the safe zone.  
These are important calculations, as unstable and insolvent firms have incentives 
to engage in distortionary behavior that may directly or indirectly reduce the performance 
on DOD contracts (Harris & Bromiley, 2007). Also, excess cash flow is critical for firms 
to participate in value-maximizing projects, including investing in cutting-edge production 
technologies and hiring quality employees (Jensen, 1996; Richardson, 2006). The above 
calculations did not indicate deficiencies within either firm. Both LMT and OSK have 
enough cash on hand and sufficient solvency to invest in necessary processes and 
procedures to enable efficient performance on DOD contracts. Furthermore, both firms 
expressed measurements near or better than the industry standards illustrated in Table 3.  
 
17 In Table 2, if the average is conducted without PACCR Inc., the average DSO for 2014 was 51.8 
days.  
18 Altman (1983) describes the bankrupt zone (X<1.8) as indicative of scores for firms of past bankrupt 
companies. Gray zone (1.8–3.0) is a firm with a score that is “typifying a questionable fate” (p. 38). A firm 
in the safe zone (X>3.0) is considered to have metrics that are healthy and solvent.  
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4. Market Competitiveness 
The AWF must ensure there is adequate competition to establish price 
reasonableness.19 The defense industrial base is shrinking due to mergers and acquisitions. 
It has become less competitive and more oligopolistic. The HHI assists the AWF to 
understand the industrial landscape of a particular contract. The JLTV program attracts a 
limited number of bidders. Including the correct number of companies for this industry was 
a challenge. We compared firms using the federal government’s North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS)20 code of 336992: Military Armored Vehicle, Tank, and 
Tank Component Manufacturing. Table 4 represents those firms and the HHI analysis.  
Table 4. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Source: GSA (2020).  




1. Lockheed Martin Corp.  $ 37,175,375,556  57.05% 3254.70 
4. General Dynamics Corp.  $ 12,017,722,203  18.44% 340.03 
5. Northrop Grumman Corp.   $ 9,168,802,601  14.07% 197.96 
9. BAE Systems PLC  $ 4,694,163,942  7.20% 51.84 
41. Atlantic Diving Supply Inc.  $ 894,220,710  1.37% 1.88 
51. Rolls-Royce Holdings PLC  $ 667,535,128  1.02% 1.04 
25. Oshkosh Corp.  $ 540,546,643  0.83% 0.69 
 DOD Dollars Obligated  $ 65,158,366,784  HHI Score  3,848  







19 According to FAR 6.102 (2020), “Contracting officers shall provide for full and open competition 
that are best suited to the circumstances of the contract action and consistent with the need to fulfill the 
Government’s requirements efficiently.”  
20 A NAICS code is a classification within the North American Industry Classification System. It was a 
system developed for use by federal statistical agencies for the collection, analysis, and publication of 
statistical data related to the U.S. economy. 
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The companies listed in Table 4 were chosen based on the following criteria:  
∑ Publicly Traded Company21 
∑ Listed the NAICS code of 336992 on www.sam.gov 
∑ Ranked in the top 100 defense contractors for FY2013 
Although the list is not all inclusive, when combined, these companies can summarize 
industry competition for purposes of market research.  
 Outlined in Table 4, the HHI for the examined industry was calculated by 
identifying each company’s market share based on the total dollars obligated to the DOD 
in FY2013. After squaring each market share component, the resulting sum and Herfindahl 
score was found to be 3,848. This score is above the 2,500-point limit, indicating that the 
market is concentrated for this specific industry. As illustrated in the case study, LMT 
controls a 57% market share in the production of armored vehicles, tanks, and tank 
component manufacturing; however, the winning offeror, OSK, only controls less than 1% 
of the market share.  
 Although the HHI can provide valuable insight, especially when combined with 
other statistical measures, there are limitations to its application. First, many of the firms 
compete within different industries. Thus, the firms’ sales do not reflect any one market 
segment. Second, due to the breadth (i.e., numerous core competencies22) of larger firms, 
it is difficult to narrow the field of firms capable of competing for a particular contract. For 
example, LMT’s sales are predominantly from its aeronautics and space system segments, 
and it does not have a market segment designated for Military Armored Vehicle, Tank, and 
Tank Component Manufacturing (SEC, 2015a). Third, due to the complexity of each 
contract, prime contractors may partner with numerous subcontractors who would 
otherwise be rivals. These three limitations greatly disable the interested party from gaining 
an accurate market concentration metric for a particular industry.  
 
21 A company is publicly traded when its securities trade on public markets and the company discloses 
certain business and financial information regularly to the public (Easton et al. 2018). 
22 A core competency is a concept in management theory introduced by C. K. Prahalad (1993). It can be 
defined as “a harmonized combination of multiple resources and skills that distinguish a firm in the 
marketplace”; core competencies are, therefore, the foundation of companies’ competitiveness. 
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 Despite the limitations mentioned above, the HHI should be included within the 
AWF’s routine market research.23 It is the contracting officer’s responsibility to 
understand the commercial landscape well enough to determine what potential firms should 
be considered for a particular contract. This calculation is best utilized during the pre-award 
phase to determine those firms with core competencies directly related to the contract 
requirements. Implementing this measurement into the market research checklist 
establishes greater awareness of the commercial landscape. 
5. Company Priorities  
In addition to the financial measurements provided above, there are additional 
insights within the SEC Form 10-K and DEF 14A. An analysis of these documents from 
FY2013 and FY2014 may help provide additional context to assess whether OSK and LMT 
had the capability and capacity for the 2015 JLTV contract award. Specifically, the MD&A 
and business segment discussion in the 10-K and the executive compensation in the DEF 
14A provide implications as to each firms’ management priorities. These factors include 
dependency on federal government contracts, discussion of important programs, and how 
the BOD compensates the CEO.  
Both LMT and OSK had significant ties to the federal government prior to the 
JLTV contract award on August 25, 2015. Table 3 illustrates how dependent OSK and 
LMT were on federal government contracts relative to net sales for FYs 2013–2014. In 
2014, the industry average was 43% compared to OSK’s and LMT’s 25% and 79%, 
respectively. This amounted to $36 billion and $1.7 billion in net sales for LMT and OSK, 
respectively. This is a significant portion of sales for both companies, especially during a 
period of sequestration. Average sales for the industry went down −1.6% and −5.2% for 
FY2013 and FY2014. This contract was very important during a time of declining sales.  
LMT’s market segments include aeronautics, information systems and global 
solutions, missiles and fire control, mission systems and training, and space systems. These 
 
23 Regarding market research, FAR 10.002 (2020) states, “On an ongoing basis, take advantage (to the 
maximum extent practicable) of commercially available market research methods in order to effectively 
identify the capabilities of small businesses and new entrants into Federal contracting that are available in 
the marketplace” (para. [2][vi]). 
   
 
51 
segments suggest that LMT’s core competencies do not pertain to the manufacturing of up-
armored all-terrain vehicles. Yet, LMT has been competing for this contract since the 
technology development phase in 2006 (Feickert, 2020). Its most popular and lucrative 
programs include the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, C-130 Hercules, F-16 Fighting 
Falcon, F-22 Raptor, and the C-5M Super Galaxy (SEC, 2020a). OSK’s core competencies, 
however, directly pertain to this contract. OSK’s business segments include access 
equipment (e.g., towing vehicles and scissor lifts), defense (e.g., tactical trucks, trailers, 
and supply parts), fire and emergency (e.g., fire trucks, snowplows, and ambulatory 
vehicles), and commercial (e.g., concrete mixers and garbage trucks). Despite not having 
the DOD as its primary customer, OSK is responsible for major defense programs like the 
mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle, the heavy-expanded-mobility tactical 
truck (HEMTT), and the M-ATV. In June 2009, the DOD awarded OSK a sole source 
contract worth approximately $1 billion to manufacture more than 2,000 M-ATVs to better 
protect troop movement in the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters (Lipscomb, 2011). The stark 
contrast between OSK and LMT with regards to government dependency and core 
competencies may highlight LMT’s need to bid on major contracts outside of its expertise 
and capability. Furthering this discussion, LMT did not mention the JLTV contract once 
within the Form 10-K for FY2013 and FY2014. OSK, however, discussed the JLTV 
contract in detail for both years. While this would be considered a lucrative contract for 
OSK, LMT’s F-35 program represented 20% ($9.2 billion), 17% ($7.7 billion), and 16% 
($7.2 billion) of the firm’s net sales for each of the FYs ending in 2013, 2014, and 2015, 
respectively (SEC, 2020a). After consulting both companies’ MD&As and business 
segment narratives, OSK appeared most favorable to win the contract.  
 As discussed in the literature review, the BOD does not arbitrarily reward their 
executives. Compensation plans are a means to retain executive talent and mitigate any risk 
those plans may encourage. Donnelly, OSK’s chairman of the board (COB), wrote, “our 
compensation programs effectively create a proper balance between appropriate risk-
taking and competitive compensation” (SEC, 2014g, p. 63). There are two assumptions 
pertaining to compensation packages that provide the framework to align risk preference 
within an organization. First, the difference of risk attitudes between executives and 
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shareholders are different. Generally, shareholders are considered risk-neutral as they 
prefer greater risk due to their personnel having greater diversity (e.g., diversification 
within a financial portfolio, separate employment; Devers et al., 2007). Alternatively, 
executives are risk averse as their personal wealth is directly tied to their employer (Devers 
et al., 2007). Second, large company returns come when large risks are taken (Devers et 
al., 2007). These assumptions force the BOD to match a firm’s strategic objectives with an 
executive’s perception of personal and firm risk.  
 Table 1 reveals that the BOD prefers to compensate their executives most through 
stock awards and non-equity incentive plans (i.e., cash bonuses). Both methods can provide 
incentive for greater risk-taking and the execution of a firm’s long-term strategy. The 
greatest difference between these two incentives are direct ownership of the firm (i.e., stock 
awards). Consequently, executives who receive aggressive non-equity incentive plans may 
be the most inclined to behave with the most risk aversion (Devers et al., 2007). 
B. LIMITATIONS 
Publicly traded companies make up most of the defense business sector; however, 
a portion of defense spending still goes toward privately held firms. These private 
companies would not be able to be evaluated as outlined in this study unless their financial 
and managerial accounting data can be obtained, and that information is often held closely. 
The most significant limitation in the case study assessment was the narrow scope of 
financial statements that are publicly available. For future use, this means all evaluations 
conducted are constrained to those companies that are publicly traded. Limitations also 
exist in the timing of a publicly traded company’s financial reporting periods. Quarterly 
and annual statements may not reflect the most relevant financial condition of a firm when 
the government is seeking a contractual relationship. Due to the periodic nature of financial 
reporting, there may be a limited understanding of a firm’s financial status leading up to 
and including the negotiation process.   
Additionally, in a quantitative analysis such as this study, the conclusions made 
heavily depend on the accuracy of reported financial data. Trust is placed in business 
entities for financial reporting not to be misrepresented in any way. As noted in our 
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accounting research, it is not unheard of for a company to have misrepresented information 
on the financial statements, either by mistake or deliberately. Regardless, the AWF could 
assess a company based on information that is not entirely correct; however, this analysis 
aspect is largely uncontrollable.  
Another encountered limitation is that the company’s assessed financial ratios and 
metrics are only one component of a company’s annual and quarterly financial statements. 
Numerical reporting is not the only data contained in the financial statements. There are 
multiple pages of textual information that offer significant information toward 
understanding the company’s landscape and operating environment. For example, the 
MD&A presents components of a company’s internal affairs. Specifically, it could offer 
textual details regarding the political, environmental, or internal operations of the company 
if deconstructed and analyzed. These seemingly mundane details could offer the AWF 
further clarifications into a company’s condition beyond what is provided in the numerical 
data in financial statements. When paired with financial data and properly analyzed, this 
data could reveal extensive insights to frame defense acquisitions.  
Limitations also existed in the comparative analysis components of the study. 
Choosing companies to collectively assess can change depending on market conditions and 
acquisition type. Lists of top defense contractors, as well as industry standards like NAICS 
codes, can be subjective. The financial ratios and metrics calculate and fluctuate drastically 
depending on the companies selected for evaluation.  
A potential solution for addressing the limitations of HHI would be using a similar 
NAICS code that corresponds to a less defense-centric product. This would make the 
equation more reliable than just comparing companies that could do the work versus the 
ones that are registered for this type of work. For instance, the NAICS of 336112, Light 
Truck and Utility Vehicle Manufacturing, is considered the industry equivalent of the 
assessed NAICS 336992. All companies listed under 336112 have the potential of 
competing in a contract like the JLTV.  




Financial ratio analysis is regarded as one of the most informative sources to gain 
insight about a company’s affairs (El Hennaway & Morris, 1983). Our research aims to 
explore this concept to improve AWF decision-making by decreasing asymmetrical 
information between government and its industry partners. We use the JLTV contract as a 
case study to illustrate the use of financial analysis as a methodology for the AWF’s market 
research. This analysis was conducted using publicly available information derived from 
annual statements and definitive proxy statements (DEF 14A) found on sec.gov. 
Calculations were conducted on OSK, LMT and peer firms for individual comparison and 
creation of several industry standards. Some of the more notable findings from these 
measurements are summarized below and used to help determine if LMT and OSK are (1) 
responsible,24 (2) capable, and (3) capacity to perform the JLTV contract.  
While comparing OSK and LMT measurements provide some insight, it is also 
necessary to compare them to an industry standard. Firms competing within various 
industries may have unique implications due to varying business operations. This was a 
limitation we tried to mitigate by analyzing eight similar competitors. These firms are 
publicly traded, regularly conduct business with the federal government, and are among 
the largest in the industry. All measurements were placed into each of the five respective 
categories to help organize our assessment: profitability and performance, operational 
efficiency, solvency and stability, market competitiveness, and company priorities.  
First, profitability and performance metrics inform the interested party as to how 
fast a firm is growing (or declining) and whether its past performance is consistent. 
Generally, higher numerical values in this category are positive. Availability of cash from 
operating activities indicates growth opportunity and/or the ability to pay off interest 
payments. For the selected years, OSK and LMT displayed encouraging metrics. While 
 
24 According to FAR 9.104-1 (2020), “The FAR outlines seven criteria to determine if a firm is 
responsible. These criteria include (a) have adequate financial resources to perform the contract, or the 
ability to obtain them and (b) be able to comply with the required or proposed delivery or performance 
schedule, taking into consideration all existing commercial and governmental business commitments.”  
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sales declined for the industry due to federal government sequestration, OSK and LMT 
maintained profitability (NPMR).  
Second, the operational efficiency measurements inform how well a firm utilizes 
its resources (assets) to provide its services and/or manufacture its products. For example, 
a large sales backlog may provide implications as to whether a firm has the capacity to take 
on additional contracts (capacity). Backlog represents the dollar value of firm orders for 
which work has not been performed. There are two general assumptions one can make 
from a firm with a large sales backlog. First, while a firm with a large unfulfilled backlog 
may have the capability to perform a service and/or manufacture a product, it may not have 
the resources available to meet its deadlines. The industry standard for both years (2013 
and 2014) reveals a sales backlog of 157% and 170% for FYs 2013 and 2014, respectively. 
This indicates to investors that there is a “long-term visibility of revenues,” which brings 
“confidence in the future prospects for the business” (BAE Systems, 2015, p. 8). A firm 
with excessive sales backlog may have implications for product delivery and capacity. The 
industry carries a significant sales backlog (170%). This highlights OSK as being 
abnormal. One could perceive OSK as having limited prospects due to this disparity.  
Third, solvency and stability factors such as D/E ratio, ICR, and the Altman’s Z-
score attempt to measure the reliability of a firm. The most notable metric from this 
category was LMT’s D/E ratio of 9.9 for FY2014. It varied greatly from the industry 
standard and OSK. By leveraging too much of its business using debt, LMT may run the 
risk of defaulting. However, LMT shows an excellent metric for the ICR (16.45) and 
operating cash flow. Taken together, LMT can handle its unique D/E metric.  
Fourth, we understood the fifth category, market competitiveness, by utilizing the 
HHI. This metric revealed that the Military Armored Vehicle, Tank, and Tank Component 
Manufacturing industry was highly concentrated. If an industry/market is highly 
concentrated, there is limited competition available. More pressure is on the AWF to tailor 
a contract to find best value.  
Finally, to ascertain company priorities, we discussed executive compensation and 
federal government dependency. After reviewing OSK’s and LMT’s executive 
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compensation plans, it was determined that the BODs place the greatest incentive on stock 
options and non-equity incentives, not salary. While literature on this topic progresses and 
shows complexity, placing a greater value on incentives outside of salary encourages risk 
averse behavior in CEOs. Examples of these types of behaviors include mergers, 
acquisitions, and increased projects (Devers et al., 2007). Government dependency showed 
us raw implications. LMT is greatly dependent upon federal contracts to continue its 
prosperity. During times of sequestration, LMT may bid on contracts outside of its core 
competencies, as we witnessed with the JLTV.  
The “strongest evidence” of knowledge gaps within the AWF lie within “industry 
financial practices, such as financial management–related operations, corporate financial 
documents, and industry accounting understanding” (Werber et al., 2019, p. XIV). Our 
research efforts were directly aimed at narrowing this gap as we sought answers to our 
research questions. The first research question posed, “How does understanding a 
contractor’s publicly available financial documents reduce information asymmetry?” has 
been answered by identifying, defining, and describing various financial measurements 
regarding a firm’s operations—which correlate to outcomes on federal procurements. This 
study offers a preview into business practices and urges the AWF to become more aware 
of industry motivations and priorities.  
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2018 encourages the 
AWF to become trained and educated based on globally recognized professional 
credentials and standards (NDAA, 2017). This initiative will also bridge the information 
and knowledge gap between the AWF and the DOD’s industry partners. The gap will 
continue to narrow as the AWF becomes literate in business acumen. Procurement 
decisions will improve through the acquisition life cycle as the AWF evolves to think more 
like our private sector business partners.  
“How can the AWF use a contractor’s publicly available financial documents to 
make better procurement decisions to enhance outcomes?” Of the five categories, company 
priorities was the most revealing. After consulting each firm’s government dependency 
(reliance on federal government contracts) and sales backlog, and after reading each firm’s 
business and MD&A sections (Form 10-K), we determined that LMT was not the 
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appropriate choice for the JLTV contract. This opinion has several caveats, as LMT may 
have had the capability and prototype to be competitive. We argue against awarding LMT 
the contract for several reasons. First, LMT was outside of its core competency and lacked 
past performance. At the time of award, it did not have any programs within the specific 
industry: Military Armored Vehicle, Tank, and Tank Component Manufacturing. Second, 
given the company’s declining sales, their significant reliance on federal government 
contracts, and the fact that it was a period of federal government sequestration, LMT was 
bidding on contracts outside of its scope. Last, LMT’s sales backlog indicates that LMT’s 
business operations are preoccupied. It promotes the perception that the firm is pushing its 
way into a market where it does not belong. For example, LMT’s F-35 program has cost 
the government $400 billion as of March 2016 (Sullivan, 2016). This is LMT’s most 
lucrative program, which still requires completion. This aircraft is among the many 
unfulfilled orders in LMT’s sales backlog and represents a Nunn–McCurdy breach.25 This 
particular contract favored OSK, and the Army selected the correct firm for contract award.  
We demonstrated how procurement officials can use financial information to 
narrow the knowledge gap; however, this question was not able to be fully answered by 
the case study we chose. There are some theoretical applications, including agency theory, 
that need to be considered when the AWF is making procurement decisions. Furthermore, 
the federal government acquisitions education framework, including financial 
documentation analysis, is in its infancy. The categories and measurements observed 
cannot be viewed in isolation; however, when compounded, they are insightful to those 
that can interpret their meaning. Furthermore, there are more data sources that provide 
critical financial information than Form 10-K and DEF 14A documents. The key is in the 
ability to interpret financial data, which we hope the AWF can surmise from our research. 
The information found and the conclusions made from this case study will be different for 
any new or current evaluation for another acquisition. We could not determine the Army’s 
contract award would have been different based on our observations alone. However, more 
 
25 Section 2433 of Title 10 of the U.S.C., commonly referred to as the Nunn–McCurdy Act (1982), 
requires DoD to notify Congress whenever a major defense acquisition program’s unit cost experiences 
cost growth that exceeds certain thresholds. 
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information regarding a contractor’s financial health was found to be better than none at 
all. We have proven this assessment can be conducted through our case study; however, 
this analysis was retroactive. If the AWF understands and practices this type of analysis, 
better outcomes are sure to be had on current and future acquisitions 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE EFFORT 
In the following chapter, we apply context to our findings section by describing 
how these results impact the AWF and contract design. We make recommendations within 
contract execution and provide actions the AWF can make to develop education and 
training. We end this study by providing areas for further research in the acquisition career 
field.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AWF DEVELOPMENT 
Performing financial analysis to understand more about the DOD’s industry 
partners is a valuable tool that can enhance the acquisition process and influence better 
public procurement policies regarding development initiatives. This research illustrates 
that there is value in infusing the AWF with external business knowledge. In this section, 
we discuss various ways the AWF’s training and development can improve to further meet 
the intent of our research. 
First, the DOD’s current education and training offers limited opportunities to learn 
about our industry partners. We discovered that the DOD offers a few courses providing 
specific industry knowledge. These courses include two DAU courses: (1) Acquisition 
Management (ACQ) 315: Understanding Industry and (2) Business, Cost Estimating, and 
Financial Management (BCF) 205: Contractor Business Strategies (O’Donnell, 2018). 
Although these courses may be beneficial to the AWF, annual attendance capacity is 
limited to approximately 1,300 persons (Werber et al., 2019). While these courses offer a 
capacity of 1300, that doesn’t necessarily mean that all vacancies are filled. While these 
courses have had great reviews, the material is not disseminated across the AWF 
population. Increasing the number and capacity of these types of courses will further 
develop AWF competencies.  
Our research identifies gaps in knowledge and provides a roadmap to narrow the 
gap. There are policies and instructions made available to the AWF, but the policies and 
instructions do not offer tools and solutions for how to improve. For example, services 
acquisition instructions state that the Services Requirements Review Board (SRRB) should 
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review “contractor issues” in relation to risks during successful execution and completion 
of the acquisition (DOD, 2020), but the board does not clarify what kinds of issues exist 
and where those issues may originate. Our research specifically outlines where issues may 
originate as components of agency theory. The instruction also fails to describe the industry 
knowledge level of the functional services manager (FSM), the key position responsible 
for all resourcing and oversight of the services acquisition process (DOD, 2020). The 
infusion of concepts derived from our research into AWF knowledge requirements will 
help connect meaningful concepts for positions like the FSM to actionable decision 
responses.  
The following are some initiatives to help the AWF culture shift from business 
advisors to mission-focused business leaders26 who function as developed acquisition 
professionals leading with in-depth knowledge of how industry thinks and operates (Air 
Force Installation Contracting Center [AFICC], 2020). The first important enhancement 
that will assist this culture shift is the recent change to a national certification process. The 
AWF training and development is changing as the DOD moves away from Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certification and transitions to mirror 
industry standards utilizing National Contract Management Association (NCMA)’s 
Contract Management Standard (CMS) and the Program Management Professional (PMP) 
certification. These new standards include a section on understanding the offeror’s 
involvement in the acquisition process (Herrington, 2020)⸺that is half of the procurement 
process. Emphasizing, broadcasting, and supporting this change across the DOD’s 
acquisition functions will begin to shift the culture.  
Another solution proposed by the 2018 Professional Services Council (PSC) survey 
that needs promotion is industry rotations, which provide in-depth, hands-on experience 
working alongside providers of defense services (Professional Services Council & Grant 
Thornton Public Sector [PSC & GTPS], 2018). Industry rotations programs like the Air 
 
26 Mission-focused business leadership focuses on transitioning our acquisition workforce from business 
advisors to business leaders. Cultivating strong mission focused business leaders will help acquisition 
professionals make better decisions, which generates a tremendous amount of momentum aligning us to a 
common purpose (AFICC, 2020). 
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Force’s Education with Industry should continue to be supported and expanded as mission 
requirements allow. The survey also revealed the effectiveness of Reverse Industry Days 
to help bridge the government–industry relationship gap. These day-long seminars are 
designed to allow industry to teach the government what is important to them and often 
showcase their capabilities (PSC & GTPS, 2018). Initiatives such as these can create 
knowledgeable leaders within the AWF.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONTRACT EXECUTION 
Before we begin our discussion on our recommendations for contract execution, it 
is important to understand that our research team sees contract management as an art. 
Contracts should be tailored and carefully designed to reduce principal–agent problems 
while also encouraging a win–win outcome. Our team believes that AWF professionals can 
better craft procurement strategies by incorporating knowledge and tools to reduce 
asymmetric information. Contract management requires tailoring contracts to reach the 
acquisition objectives. In this section, our team outlines four major recommendations on 
how the information gathered though the financial analysis relates to government 
procurement on a contract execution level.  
As we mentioned in the results section, our team has organized various financial 
ratios into five different categories. Each of these categories tell us something different 
about a company’s operations and financial health. Therefore, each of these categories 
provides knowledge that informs various AWF decisions. The categories are profitability 
and performance, operational efficiency, solvency and stability, market effectiveness, and 
company priorities. The conclusions within each of these categories may offer insights to 
sharpen the AWF’s strategic approach to a particular procurement activity.  
First, all of the categories contain information that the AWF can utilize when 
evaluating proposals. Taken together, most of the ratios can be used to highlight and depict 
the capability and capacity of potential offerors. As we discussed earlier, a contractor 
should be evaluated on their capabilities and their capacity to take on additional work and 
not just their reputation (Williamson, 1967). In other words, the AWF should not rely on 
past experience as the only means for determining capability. Understanding what 
   
 
62 
obligations the contractor already has, and how well the company is doing financially, is 
also an important factor in accessing a company’s capability and capacity. In FAR Part 9 
(2020), Contractor Qualifications, there are discussions about the ways the AWF finds a 
contractor to be a responsible source (meaning the contractor has the capability to perform). 
However, based on observations in the field, contractors have never used a real-time, in-
depth financial analysis to make responsible decisions. As an example, financial ratios 
within the solvency and stability category (sales backlog, debt to income, etc.) can be used 
to identify when there should be concerns about a company’s ability to perform. For 
example, in the financial ratio analysis that we performed for LMT and OSK, we found 
that LMT had a sales backlog greater than 100%. This means that they have a large 
proportion of previous obligations yet to be fulfilled. This could be one indicator that LMT 
may not have the capacity to take on a new contract or have the ability to prioritize a new 
requirement. 
Does the AWF keep offering new work to a contractor if they are already struggling 
to deliver on previous contract awards? This is not a new question to consider. However, 
when there is limited cross talk between acquisition teams, financial analysis could be 
another resource for indicating that a firm is overstretched. The conclusion may not be a 
new solution but may indicate the need to trigger policies that the DOD already has in 
place. For example, if the AWF continues to see that a certain market is stretched too thin 
(indicated by the HHI metric), it may be important for the AWF to encourage more business 
to enter the market or to encourage more competition (hence, the Competition in 
Contracting Act27). The DOD may need to investigate current policies, find ways to 
decrease the barriers to entry, and assist companies with gaining access to the DOD market. 
Second, in the category of solvency and stability, the financial ratios—like 
Altman’s Z-score or debt-to-income ratios—could indicate when a contractor is under 
financial distress. These ratio indicators could identify when additional oversight of the 
contractor may be required. This oversight could be essential for controlling costs, keeping 
 
27 The Competition in Contracting Act was enacted by congress in 1984 with the intent increasing the 
number of vendors to encourage competition. Benefits of the act include an increase in contracted savings 
through lower prices driven by competition (CICA, 1984).  
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on schedule, ensuring quality products and services, or even preventing fraud. These 
indicators that allude to a company being in financial distress could affect the contract 
award decisions but could also clue in the AWF to evaluate the DOD’s internal capacity to 
monitor and oversee the contractor appropriately. These indicators may lead a contracting 
officer to reach out to other departments, like the Defense Contract Audit Agency, to assist 
with audits to ensure proper oversight and overall contractor accountability.  
Third, principal–agent problems, along with our analysis of the category 
profitability and performance, have indicated that there may be holes in our DOD 
procurement policies. As the AWF become more in tune with industry operations, the DOD 
can create more effective policies that incentivize contractors to behave in the best interest 
of the government. For example, the DOD can create a policy to incentivize the contractor 
to invest additional capital in a way that enhances a company’s operations and furthers 
future technology (which benefits the DOD), instead of investing that capital to buy back 
stock.  
Fourth, the FAR can be restrictive and may not allow contracting officers the 
flexibility necessary to customize incentives or negotiate better contract terms (Pritchard 
& Krieger, 2016). As one example, within firm-fixed price contracts, enhanced progress 
payments and liquidation rates could be an added incentive for industry to perform better 
(Pritchard & Krieger, 2016). Right now, per FAR 32.5 (2020), Progress Payments Based 
on Costs, there are only two types of progress payments: customary progress payments and 
unusual progress payments. A policy change would be needed within the FAR to take 
advantage of this new negotiating and payment tactic. The current U.S.C. does not prohibit 
this new methodology. 
Figure 6 summarizes the possible outcomes that could come from understanding a 
company’s financial information. This information will vary from contractor to contractor 
and will vary across different acquisitions. However, procurement strategies can only be 
improved by knowing more about the partnering company. We have discussed many of the 
possible outcomes above. 




Figure 5. Potential Impact to AWF Practices  
Ultimately, as the AWF becomes increasingly attune with how DOD’s industry 
partners operate, the more we can bridge these gaps in knowledge, business acumen, 
contract operations, and procurement policies. Our research mission was to highlight ways 
that the AWF could use publicly available financial information in a way that could assist 
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with real-time evaluations of contractor responsibility (capability and capacity) and with 
properly designing contracts that incentivize the contractor in a way that is most 
advantageous to all parties. This would mean that each acquisition would be unique in 
nature, but the AWF would be able to evaluate and negotiate terms and conditions that 
create a win–win solution for both the government and the contractor. Our research is just 
a first step toward filling the knowledge gap and attempting to make reasonable 
recommendations. Further research and case study analysis could reveal more significant 
observations that lead to further recommendations for the AWF procurement procedures. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study is the first iteration of translating contractor financial statements, 
typically used for investors, into information that would be useful to the AWF. One area 
for further research would be to employ the methodology used in this study to other cases 
and outcomes of DOD acquisitions. This continued case study analysis would be used to 
validate our observations and verify correlation between financial knowledge and outcome 
of negotiation events. We identified a select group of ratios that would assist the AWF in 
understanding a company’s financial position. However, the quarterly and annual 
statements include a majority of textual content that would be helpful in understanding 
other environmental concerns and providing clarity and direction for some of the ratios. 
Further research would identify how textual analysis can transcribe and analyze the 
financial statements and quarterly shareholder conference calls for applicable information. 
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